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Abstract— During this recent period of economic crisis and 
rising unemployment, General Motors, the US multinational, 
announced its decision to sell off Opel, its loss-making European 
operations. Foreign divestment (FD) decisions are notoriously 
secret, and often very controversial, arousing strong opposition. 
Whilst such decisions are difficult to make, they are an essential 
aspect of corporate international business strategy. Plant 
closures that involve substantial lay-offs attract scrutiny from 
governments and policy-makers. This paper explores the recent 
major divestment proposals by these two global auto producers 
and the subsequent negotiations with governments in the home 
and host nations. 
 
Index Terms—Autos; Competition Policy; Foreign divestment; 
Globalization; Industrial Policy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
oreign divestment (FD) decisions are shrouded in secrecy 
and this explains the limited research in this area [1].  
Divestment is clearly an essential aspect of contemporary 
business strategy, yet “despite numerous studies on 
divestment decisions of firms, there is much we do not know 
about how divestment fits into a firm’s broader strategy of 
growth” [2]. The extant literature on voluntary divestment and 
FD is very limited. Indeed, research in this area has declined 
since the 1990s. 
 
The literature evolved as follows: the magnitude of FD 
from a home country perspective, with an emphasis upon 
manufacturing MNCs [3]; the FD decision process [4]; the 
political and public relations dimensions of FD [5]; the host 
country dimension in terms of causes and implementation of 
FD decisions [6]; and the theory of FD [7]. More recent 
studies have examined international retail divestment [8], but 
recent research in other service sectors is sparse.  
 
FD decisions involving closures and large job losses are 
seldom unexpected, but instead are prefaced by years of 
gradual decline and lay-offs. Many MNCs that have closed  
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large facilities have experienced strong criticism and 
opposition from employees and their representatives, the 
media, and political figures. The FD process after the closure 
announcement may be restricted to simply a public relations 
battle, but may in extreme cases result in illegal worker 
occupation of the factory, and attempts to orchestrate a 
consumer boycott of the divesting firm’s products [9]. 
However, given that the FD decision is so difficult to make, 
stakeholder efforts to reverse the decision are seldom, if ever, 
successful [10]. Indeed, some MNCs prepare detailed plans 
that not only anticipate opposition, but orchestrate the 
responses from unwitting stakeholders. In recent years, 
though, America’s General Motors (GM) reversed a major FD 
decision, its decision to sell off a majority stake in Opel, its 
European operations. This paper focuses upon the proposed 
FD process, and corporate-state negotiations, a neglected area 
of business strategy and international business.   
 
This paper examines the context of the Opel situation, the 
political and regulatory factors in the key locations most 
affected by the proposed divestment, as well as the role of the 
European Competition Commission in influencing corporate 
decision-making. In the case of GM, this decision involved 
FD that was defensive in nature. The paper makes a 
significant contribution to the FD literature in providing a 
detailed overview of the factors that led to each company 
abandoning its FD decision.  Given the poor current economic 
conditions, an intensely competitive environment in numerous 
industries, the impact of new technologies, and deteriorating 
corporate performance, many more divestments can be 
expected.  This paper provides an opportunity for companies 
and governments to learn the lessons from these cases.  This 
paper also provides an opportunity to revisit FD theory. 
 
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Globalization has resulted in companies increasingly 
dispersing their international production operations. This can 
result in a loss of jobs in the home country and create tensions 
between the MNC and trades unions and politicians in the 
home country. Critics in a diverse number of home countries 
accuse MNCs of “de-industralization”  and “exporting jobs” 
[11]. However, the MNC may counteract that relocating 
production overseas is essential to safeguard employment 
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 domestically, and necessary for enhancing competitiveness as 
well as protecting shareholders [12]. This argument is 
magnified when the MNC is wholly or partially state-owned 
and has been a recipient of state subsidies. 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) competing in a global 
industry must develop a strategy that manages tensions 
between localization and globalization [13]. They establish 
international production operations to enhance their 
competitiveness by gaining closer proximity to markets, 
access to lower costs of production and access to raw 
materials [14]. 
 
Economies that attract and retain investment can reap 
significant economic benefits in terms of job creation, reduced 
imports, possible exports and spillover benefits [15]. 
Competition between nations to attract and retain investment 
is intense [16]. Consequently, economies provide significant 
financial incentives to attract and retain inward investment 
[17]. Where the “carrot” does not work, an economy may use 
the “stick” and threaten the potential divesting MNC with 
national boycotts or other restrictions [18]. Thus, the MNC’s 
decision-making may be influenced by the extent of 
government commitment to safeguarding jobs. The 
divestment process is thus highly politicized, and it is 
essential that the MNC approach divestment strategically and 
from a public relations perspective [19]. 
 
FD theory [20] has been described as a reversal of foreign 
direct investment theory. For example, Hymer suggests that 
firm-specifics assets are the key to foreign investment, and 
loss of those assets would signal a firm ripe for disinvestment 
[21]. In a further extension of investment theory, is Vernon’s 
Product Life Cycle [22] theory notes that factors of 
production such as labor costs are significant when 
determining the location of production. Once this advantage 
subsides, the evolution of the life cycle would suggest that 
divestment would occur [23]. Finally, Dunning [24] notes in 
his Eclectic Theory that there are three advantages essential 
for foreign investment to occur (firm-specific, internalization 
and location-specific advantages).  Loss of any one of these 
advantages may actually trigger divestment [25]. 
 
FD theory suggests that divestment may occur whenever 
the MNC loses its competitive advantage, ceases to have an 
incentive to internalize its operations, or the host economy 
loses its location-specific advantage(s). Divestments can also 
arise due to precipitating circumstances [26]. It often took the 
appointment of a new CEO with no attachment to previous 
investment decisions to overcome this emotional “barrier to 
exit.” Besides, changes in the external environment can be 
regarded as a key divestment trigger.   
 
Some divestments are defensive or a response to “corporate 
crisis”, whilst others are voluntary or “positive restructuring” 
[27]. The former arises when an MNC or its regional 
operations incur major losses over a number of years as it 
suffers a notable decline in competitiveness, resulting 
externally in loss of market share and internally in 
deteriorating financial results. Qualitative studies of 
divestment have largely focused on defensive voluntary 
divestment, and they revealed that the divesting firms had 
little option but to divest [28]. Indeed, an examination of 
divested units reveals that very poor performance of the plant 
or unit was tolerated for many years provided the parent 
company remained in profit [29]. However, the onset of heavy 
losses at the parent company provided the motivation for FD 
[30], and triggered a review of operations that led to the 
closure of a loss-making unit [31. Furthermore, these 
companies often faced stronger competition for the declining 
market that the plants served.  While the plant closures of the 
1980s involved defensive voluntary divestment (DVD) 
whereby MNCs closed plants in order to try and protect their 
competitiveness in the face of weak performance, there was 
evidence in the 1990s that offensive voluntary divestment 
(OVD) was emerging as a new trend [32]. 
 
The divestment decision is one of the most difficult for 
executives to make [33]. Divestment decisions may occur 
when there is a significant deterioration in the conditions of 
the operating environment which leads to a deterioration in 
overall or subsidiary performance, thus providing the 
motivation for divestment [34]. Executives are often very 
reluctant to make the divestment decision because of its 
connotations with “failure” [35]. Thus, often divestment 
decisions are taken only after the appointment of a new CEO, 
major board room changes, or the emergence of precipitating-
circumstances [36]. 
 
Much of the extant research focuses upon case studies of 
divestment and examines the causes of plant closures [37]. 
The divestment decision is invariably a response to a 
significant worsening of overall corporate performance. Thus, 
plants selected for closure can have a long history of very 
poor performance, but this is tolerated so long as the parent 
company enjoys satisfactory, overall performance [38]. 
Divestment decisions are highly centralized, and despite 
intense opposition from local stakeholders, are never reversed 
due to external pressures. 
 
Typically, multinationals wind down a plant prior to a 
formal closure announcement [39]. It is not enough to justify 
divestment strategically, the MNC needs to have developed a 
comprehensive public relations campaign that anticipates the 
reactions of all stakeholders, and have determined in advance 
their response. Indeed, effective management of the 
divestment process demands complete preparation for all 
possible reactions [40]. European multinationals display a 
greater sense of social responsibility than US MNCs in 
managing divestments [41]. However, organizational culture 
is more important than country-of-origin in terms of 
influencing approaches to divestment decisions and 
management of the process [42]. 
Employees’ representatives, local media, and politicians 
often oppose the FD decision and seek to persuade the 
company to reverse its decision. Usually, this involves 
arguments that the plant is still profitable and a better 
performer than a plant in another community, sometimes in 
the same country [43]. However, the  FD decision is so 
difficult for executives to make, that once a public 
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 announcement is made, the decision-makers have finally 
overcome “barriers to exit” [44] and are convinced of the 
necessity of divestment [45]. “Barriers to exit” are lower in 
the case of foreign, as opposed to domestic, divestments [46]. 
 
III. GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Even prior to the onset in 2008 of the global economic 
recession, Asian rivals (i.e. from Japan and South Korea) 
were winning market share in Europe. This more hostile 
competitive environment was compounded in 2008 by a sharp 
deterioration in European market conditions [47]. Combined, 
both created massive over-capacity for European and US auto 
producers in Europe [48]. Consequently, these producers 
sought to restructure their European production network, and 
undertake divestment to align capacity with market demand 
[49]. However, in Europe’s largest car producing countries, 
corporate objectives clashed with those of governments that 
were committed to maintaining their industry and protecting 
auto workers’ jobs. 
 
The car industry in Germany remains a mix of inward 
investors and indigenous producers, with the latter accounting 
for the bulk of auto production.  In 2012, Germany was still 
by far Europe’s largest car producer (i.e. 5.4m cars), despite 
all its major indigenous companies having established a 
global production network. Germany is an expensive 
production location relative to Eastern and Southern Europe, 
although market conditions in the latter have been particularly 
weak since 2008. Consequently, Asian, European and US 
producers are all expanding production capacity in these parts 
of Europe; even Mercedes, the premium German producer, 
has established a plant in Eastern Europe.  
 
For decades, the major US car producers in Europe (i.e. 
Ford and GM) have been seeking to reduce their reliance 
upon aging plants in northern Europe as they relocate 
operations to new plants in lower cost locations in Europe. 
Closing car plants in Europe can prove difficult – although 
not impossible - in the face of opposition from governments, 
media, politicians and unions. Between 2007 and the autumn 
of 2012, only three car plants in Europe had been closed, and 
one of these was GM’s Antwerp facility [50]. Ford of Europe, 
which was operating at 65 per cent capacity and suffering 
heavy losses, finally announced its decision to close three 
plants in Europe: Genk in Belgium, with loss of 4,400 jobs in 
late 2014), and in 2013 two plants in the UK [51] where 
employment legislation is much less onerous than in France 
or Germany [52]. Whilst economic and competitive 
considerations encourage a reconfiguration of car producers’ 
European production networks, the legal and political 
environment deters restructuring.  
 
 
IV. GM EUROPE IN 2009 
 
In 2008, GM Europe consisted of four plants at Opel, its 
German subsidiary, two plants at Vauxhall, its UK subsidiary, 
and Poland, as well as one plant in Austria, Belgium, 
Hungary, and Spain. Opel’s four plants (Rüsselsheim, 
Bochum, Eisenach and Kaiserslautern) accounted for 25,000 
of Opel’s 45,000 employees. In 2007, GM reported losses of 
$38.7bn. By November 2008, the company’s net losses since 
2004 exceeded $70bn, and it had almost exhausted cash 
reserves. The company was in crisis, and its Chief Executive 
Officer (since 2000), Rick Wagoner, was determined to avoid 
bankruptcy [53]. He needed to cut costs, cut debts and raise 
capital.  
 
A. Opel for Sale and Board Room Changes.   
Beginning in early 2009, GM announced that it would seek 
a partner or sell a part of its loss-making GM Europe in an 
effort to raise money to restructure the company and revert to 
profitability. All of GM’s European assets were transferred to 
Opel, so that now Opel owned all of GM Europe [54] (The 
Guardian, 2009). However, within months of this major 
strategic divestment decision, in March 2009 the US Treasury 
Department’s auto-industry task force asked Wagoner and the 
entire GM board to resign, and he was replaced by Fritz 
Henderson [55]. 
 
GM signed in late May 2009, a tentative deal to sell a 55 
per cent stake in Opel to Canadian-Austrian parts 
manufacturer, Magna International, and Sberbank, a Russian 
bank [56]. The German government provided Opel with €1.5 
billion in bridge financing to keep Opel operating in the short 
run  [57] (Schwartz, 2009).   
 
GM on June 1, 2009, sought bankruptcy protection, and the 
Obama administration appointed Ed Whitacre as Chairman of 
GM. By July, the firm had entered into a bailout agreement 
with the US and Canadian governments and taxpayers for 
nearly $60 billion.  One of its priorities was to eliminate 
unprofitable brands [58]. GM’s international operations, 
including Opel (i.e. its European operations) were not 
included under the bankruptcy agreement. As negotiations 
with Magna stalled, other potential buyers emerged: the 
Belgian private equity firm, Ripplewood Holdings (RHJ) 
[59]. The RHJ offer appealed to GM as it allowed for GM to 
buy back a majority stake in the Opel division at a later date 
[60] However, RHJ was yet to make a profit since its 
inception in 2005, and this undermined its bid with the 
German government which was seeking assurances to 
preserve Opel as a major employer in Germany. Henderson 
and GM’s new board approved, in September 2009, in 
principle the sale of Opel to Magna 
 
The Merkel administration pledged a total of €4.5 billion of 
financing  for Magna to acquire GM Europe, an effort seen by 
most as an attempt to preserve as many German jobs as 
possible [61]. The deal also included €250 billion each from 
Magna and Sberbank; €265 million in cost savings from 
German labour, contingent on the Magna deal materializing; 
and €600 million from GM.   
 
The other European countries that hosted a GM plant 
suspected that the German brokering of the Magna deal would 
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 favour plants in Germany at their expense, and that non-
German plants would bear a disproportionate amount of job 
losses [62].  These other countries offered incentives for GM 
to preserve employment in their country. For example, the 
British Government reportedly offered $800 million in order 
to safeguard 5,500 GM jobs in the UK [63]. The European 
Union Competition Commissioner warned Germany that its 
offer to Magna could not be used to obtain preferential 
treatment for plants in Germany at the expense of the other 
countries with Opel plants. In response, the German 
government went much further and announced that its aid 
package could not be limited to one particular offer, and that 
it would be available to all investors. GM was now eligible 
for the same support offered to Magna. [64] 
 
B. GM REVERSES ITS DECISION TO DIVEST OPEL (I.E. GM 
EUROPE) 
 
GM announced on 3 November 2009, its decision to reverse 
its FD decision and abandoned its plans to sell Opel. GM 
explained its about-turn due to perceived improved market 
conditions, the strategic significance of Opel, especially 
Opel’s technological leadership in developing small, fuel-
efficient vehicles, and the desire to find the most secure and 
least expensive solution for ensuring the long-term future of 
Opel and Vauxhall [63] (van Praet, 2009a). Several other 
issues influenced reversing the FD decision.  Having received 
a US government bail-out of nearly $60 billion, GM was no 
longer under pressure to raise funds by divesting assets [65]. 
The new leadership was concerned about loss of intellectual 
property to a Russian competitor [66]  Once the German 
government assured the EU and GM that its aid package was 
also available to GM, this reduced the incentive to divest Opel 
[67]. 
 
The German and Russian governments as well as German 
labour organizations denounced the decision as “completely 
unacceptable” [68]. German labour vowed an immediate 
strike, and the Premier of the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia, home to the Bochum plant, described GM’s 
behavior as the ugly face of “turbo-capitalism” [69]. Opel’s 
CEO since 2004, Carl-Peter Forster, disagreed publicly with 
the latest decision, and he left the company. Nick Reilly was 
appointed interim CEO [70]. In contrast, the decision was met 
with relief by executives from the big three indigenous car 
producers in Germany (i.e. VW, BMW and Daimler), as well 
as governments and unions in the other European countries 
where GM had a plant [71]. 
 
C. Renewal at GM and Restructuring of Opel 
 
Whitacre in December, 2009 orchestrated the board’s 
removal of Henderson, and he also became CEO. Whitacre 
regarded Henderson, a long-serving executive with GM, as a 
product of a “broken culture incapable of changing fast” [72] 
He appointed Nick Reilly CEO of Opel in January of 2010 
[73] and GM announced 8,300 job cuts in Europe, including 
4,000 in Germany, 900 in Spain and 500 in Britain, as it 
aimed to reduce its European production capacity by 20 per 
cent [74]. 
 
Although the devolved Flemish government in Belgium had 
promised Opel aid of €500m to retain Antwerp [75] GM 
announced its decision to close the plant later in the year, 
resulting in the loss of all 2,606 jobs. Opened in 1924, at its 
peak, Antwerp had 7,000 employees [76]. Originally, GM had 
been planning on transferring production of a small SUV 
from South Korea to Antwerp but instead it transferred 
production of the two models produced at Antwerp to its 
South Korean operations [77]. Despite a brief plant blockade, 
and union accusations that the closure decision breached 
GM’s contract with its European Works Council, the Antwerp 
plant closed in 2010. 
 
Whitacre resigned as CEO on September 1, 2010, and was 
replaced by another outsider, Dan Akerson, who became 
GM’s fourth CEO since the board approved the original plan 
to sell Opel. Stephen Girsky replaced Nick Reilly as head of 
Opel in November 2011 [78]. 
 
GM formed, in November 2011, a global strategic alliance 
with France’s loss-making PSA [79]. Facing losses for the 
year of $1.5bn, Girsky announced in December 2012, GM’s 
decision to terminate production in 2016 at its Bochum plant 
in Germany with the loss of 3,300 jobs [80]. However, as 
market conditions worsened in Europe, GM announced in 
April 2013 its decision to accelerate the run-down of the 
plant, and to terminate all activities at the plant in 2014. 
Although GM stressed it remained committed to its European 
operations and promised to invest €4.0bn in Opel, rumors 
persisted that GM may yet seek to reduce its ownership in its 
European subsidiary [81]. “De-globalization” is the ultimate 




GM Europe, now Opel, has reported large and growing 
losses for many years. Despite facing excess capacity and a 
deterioration of its finances, GM failed to address the growing 
problems at its European subsidiary. Finally, GM decided to 
sell off its European operations only when the parent 
company itself approached bankruptcy.  GM’s FD decision 
conforms to condition-based and motivation-based theory of 
FD. The importance of the “new man/men” or precipitating 
circumstances in this FD decision is clear, yet contrary to 
expectations suggested by FD theory. The importance of the 
“new man/men” lies in their decisions to reverse the FD 
decision and commit to maintaining a rationalized Opel. 
 
The reversal of the FD decision was based upon a 
transformation in the financial situation at GM, the parent 
company. Home country intervention in the form of the bail-
out to safeguard the best interests of the US economy, and US 
jobs, relieved GM of the need to dispose of its European 
subsidiary. However, the US bail-out did not remove the need 
for GM to restructure its European operations. Since deciding 
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 to retain Opel, GM has already decided to divest its Antwerp 
and Bochum plants in Europe [83], and further closure(s) 
appear(s) likely if the company is to restore competitiveness 
in Europe. The formation of a strategic alliance with Peugeot 
increases the likelihood of further closures. 
 
Once GM announced its intentions to sell its European 
subsidiary, the German government played a decisive role in 
seeking to safeguard GM’s four plants in Germany and 
25,000 German jobs. Germany was also GM’s key production 
location in Europe. When the German government indicated 
that its aid package was available to any buyer of Opel, it 
could hardly have expected GM to reverse its FD decision. 
However, it underestimated the scale of internal changes at 
GM in the USA, and the determination of GM’s leadership to 
maintain a presence in a key regional market. The German 
government was so committed to safeguarding jobs in 
Germany that it was prepared to rile the “big three” German 
producers who perceived the aid package as a subsidy to a 
foreign rival (i.e. either GM or Magna). 
 
Governments in other European countries, especially those 
to long-established, mature GM plants where employment 
levels have been falling, were equally determined to safeguard 
jobs at their GM plants, but they were outmaneuvered by the 
German government. This case highlights the ability of 
MNCs to obtain incentive bidding from host governments to 
retain plants and jobs. Significantly the European Competition 
Commission played a decisive role in restricting the German 
government from offering preferential status to its preferred 
buyer of Opel.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
GM’s reversal of its FD decision is significant because it 
affords the opportunity to understand better the FD process 
and FD theory. Despite its poor performance, and its success 
in finding a buyer for Opel, GM reversed its decision as soon 
as the need to sell was reduced. In terms of FD theory, the 
conditions and motivations for FD are clear, yet the role of the 
“new man” was not to overcome “barriers to exit”, but rather 
to abort the FD decision. This paper highlights the central role 
of home and host nations in seeking to safeguard national 
employment levels at huge economic cost, even when to the 
potential detriment of indigenous producers. 
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